I work in moral, political, and legal philosophy. I recently finished my PhD from the London School of Economics. Starting fall 2020 I will be a Post-Doc at the Center for Population-Level Bioethics at Rutgers University.
My current work falls in three project. The first project is on the ethics of risk. In the past, I have worked on a contractualist account of risk imposition. More recently, I have started thinking about the ethics of risk in clinical research in particular in connection with the coronavirus pandemic. The second project is on the fair allocation of health care. In this project I seek to connect my previous work on aggregation with questions of priority-setting and rationing in health care. The third project is on discrimination. This project spans across ideas of discrimination in legal philosophy and ideas of discrimination in applied ethics, such as disability discrimination in health care.
My PhD dissertation focused on the importance of the separateness of persons. I argued for a relational understanding of the separateness of persons that supports a broadly contractualist account of morality. In the dissertation, I apply this understanding of the separateness of persons to questions of distributive justice, risk, aggregation, and deontological constraints. I also argue that the separateness of persons matters to morality even if our personal identity should not matter to us rationally.
Here is my CV. You can see short descriptions of my research below.
Limited aggregation is the view that when deciding whom to save we sometimes are allowed to pay attention to the relative numbers involved and sometimes we are not. Limited aggregation is motivated by a powerful idea: our decision whom to save should respect each person’s separate claim to our help; in particular it should respect those in need whose claims are the greatest. Recent work has provided strong challenges to such a view and shown that current proposal of limited aggregation have serious flaws. I argue for a new version of limited aggregation Hybrid Balance Relevant Claims which is well-grounded in the reasons we have to be skeptical of aggregation and avoids these challenges.
Derek Parfit famously argued that personal identity is not what matters for prudential concerns. He further claimed that his view on personal identity has profound implications for moral theory. It should lead us, among other things, to deny the separateness of persons. I argue that Parfit is mistaken about this inference. His revisionary arguments about personal identity and rationality have no implications for moral theory.
Work in progress
How should contractualists assess the permissibility of risky actions? Both, ex ante and ex post contractualism, fail to distinguish between different kinds of risk. I argue that this overlooks a third alternative, 'objective ex ante contractualism' that discounts complaints by objective risks rather than by epistemic risks. I argue that we should adopt this view since it provides us with the best model of justifiability to each.
At least in some cases we are prohibited from violating someone's right even if doing so would prevent a larger number of rights violations. But if respecting everyone’s rights is equally important, why should we not do what minimizes the number of rights violations? One possible answer is agent-based. This answer points out that you should not violate rights even if this will prevent someone else’s violations. In this paper, I develop a relational agent-based justification that focuses on the relation in which the agent stands to her would-be victims.
Effective altruism tells us that we should donate to those charities where we have good evidence that it makes the greatest possible impact. Charity evaluators run by effective altruists tell us, for example, to donate to the Against Malaria Foundation rather than Amnesty International. In this paper, we provide an internal critique of effective altruism. The motivation for effective altruism does not give us as much guidance as these charity evaluators claim. Once we recognize the diversity of charitable interventions, we see that our evidence allows us to make fewer comparisons between charities. As a result, effective altruism properly understood is more permissive in the choice of donations than previously thought.
Does judicial review stifle or enhance democracy? Ronald Dworkin argues that democracy and judicial review are compatible provided that courts will perform better at protecting rights that are constitutive of democracy. I provide a general argument based on social choice theory that a constitutional framer has good reasons to think that courts will indeed perform better. Judicial review can be justified as a good bet from the perspective of constitutional framers.